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ABSTRACT   In A Metaphysics for Freedom (2012), Helen Steward proposes and defends a 
novel version of the libertarian account of free action.  Amongst several objections that she 
considers to her view, one that looms particularly large is the Challenge from Chance: ‘the 
most powerful, widely-promulgated and important line of anti-libertarian reasoning’ (2012: 
125).  This paper begins by arguing that Steward’s response to the Challenge (or, at least, to 
one strand of it) is not fully convincing.  It then goes on to explore a further possible 
libertarian line of defence against the Challenge, arguing that it, too, ultimately fails.  The 
conclusion is that the Challenge remains an important source of dialectical advantage for the 
compatibilist. 
 
I.  Two Challenges from Chance 
Steward characterises the Challenge from Chance as the view that ‘the denial of 
determinism merely introduces an unhelpful randomness into the causal chains that 
underlie our intentional activity, and that such randomness could never help us to 
understand how free agency is possible’ (2012: 125).  Thus if free action is behaviour 
not entirely subject to deterministic causal laws, as the libertarian claims, then free 
action is, to that extent, random or chancy action, and it is difficult or impossible to 
see how such random behaviour could be meaningfully described as ‘free’ (or, 
indeed, even as ‘action’). 
 Yet what Steward calls ‘the’ Challenge from Chance is, I believe, most 
helpfully understood as a pair of related but logically independent problems.  We may 
call these the agency problem and the rational cost problem.  The former is the worry 
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that, if what I end up doing is in some sense just a matter of luck, then there is no 
relevant sense in which what I end up doing is truly up to me.  A good way of 
drawing out this concern is provided by Peter van Inwagen’s ‘rollback’ case, in which 
Alice, facing a difficult decision between lying and truth-telling, freely chooses (in 
the libertarian, indeterministic sense) to tell the truth.  Immediately after she does so, 
however, God reverts the universe to its exact state just a minute previously, and lets 
it run forward again.  Since her ‘second’ decision, like her ‘first’ one, is undetermined 
by prior causes, there is no guarantee that she will do the same again.  As van 
Inwagen puts it: 
 
Now let us suppose that God a thousand times caused the universe to revert to exactly the 
state it was in (and let us suppose that we are somehow suitably placed, metaphysically 
speaking, to observe the whole sequence of ‘replays’).  What would have happened?  
Well… sometimes Alice would have lied and sometimes she would have told the truth… 
Is it not true that as we watch the number of replays increase, we shall become convinced 
that what will happen on the next replay is a matter of chance? (2000: 14-15). 
 
Thus it may come to seem that what Alice does on any given occasion is simply up to 
chance, and therefore not up to her.  This is the first of the two challenges from 
chance. 
 The second is the problem that, if a free agent’s processes of practical 
reasoning necessarily contain elements of randomness or chance, then a free agent 
must always be at risk of acting irrationally.  Thus suppose that an agent confronts an 
opportunity set that provides just one rational option.  Under determinism, such an 
agent might be so constituted as to be guaranteed to make the rational choice.  Given 
some measure of indeterminism in action or deliberation, however, this cannot be the 
case.  For the libertarian, it therefore seems, free agents are always at risk of 
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irrationality.  Yet this means that the freedom on which the libertarian insists is 
simply the freedom to be irrational, which is a freedom that, surely, we would be 
better off without.  And it is implausible, other things equal, to suggest that free 
agency (or agency itself) depends crucially on our possession of a type of freedom 
that is worse than useless.  As Susan Wolf argues, the freedom to be irrational is one 
that one could never have reason to exercise; nor, given this, could it be a freedom 
that one could intelligibly wish to have, since: 
 
Why should one want an ability that one never wants to exercise?  Why should one care 
about being locked in a room—or, better, in a world—out of which one cannot 
conceivably want to go?  Why should one mind if, to put it in extreme terms, one is 
inescapably sane? (1990: 57) 
 
Thus such libertarian freedom cannot be of a variety ‘worth wanting’ (Dennett 1984). 
 The rational cost problem is independent of the agency problem, since even if 
we are convinced that whatever Alice chooses (in any given replay) is relevantly up 
to her, the libertarian still faces the problem of explaining how she could conceivably 
care about having the freedom to lie when she has better reason to tell the truth (or 
vice versa).  And the agency problem is independent of the rational cost problem, 
since even were we persuaded of the value of being free to act irrationally, the 
libertarian would still need to explain how this could be a freedom for us to act 
irrationally (or for us to act irrationally).  Both are potentially serious problems for 
the libertarian, and together they constitute the Challenges from Chance. 
 Although Steward does not explicitly distinguish the problems, she addresses 
both in detail.  Thus, as regards the agency problem, she suggests that it is compelling 
only insofar as the libertarian has failed to provide any positive account of what it is 
for an action to be ‘up to’ an agent in the relevant sense; that is, that it is not (or, at 
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least, that we are not simply entitled to assume that it is) merely indeterminism in 
itself that generates the worry (2012: 168-9).  Steward goes on to supply precisely 
such a positive account (2012: 197-247), but I do not assess it here; for the purposes 
of this paper, I assume for the sake of argument that some such solution to the agency 
problem is possible, focusing instead on the rational cost problem.  I argue that the 
difficulties it raises for the libertarian run deep. 
 
II. Steward on the Rational Cost Problem 
 Steward’s discussion suggests two lines of response to the rational cost 
problem.  The first lies in her observation that, when an agent chooses to φ, the 
alternative possibility on which the libertarian must insist is not that the agent might 
have chosen not to φ, but simply that the agent might not have chosen to φ (2012: 
155).  Thus the libertarian need not claim, as many compatibilists seem to assume she 
must, that a free agent must have been able to do something despite having no reasons 
in favour of (or, indeed, having decisive reasons against) doing it.  Instead, she must 
claim simply that a free agent must have been able to refrain from doing what she in 
fact did.  As regards such mere powers of refrainment the rational cost problem is, it 
seems, much less severe. 
 To illustrate this, Steward considers a case in which Joe deliberates about 
whether or not to move in with his girlfriend, sees that he has excellent reasons for 
doing so, and accordingly decides to do so at t.  She concedes that there is ‘simply no 
coherent way of understanding’ how Joe, aware of his plentiful reasons for moving 
in, could have decided not to move in; ‘we can only conceive of the possibility of 
such a “decision” occurring, if we can conceive of it at all, as a kind of random 
upsurge of total irrationality into Joe’s psychological life’ (2012: 169-70).  Yet, as she 
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goes on to point out, this need be no implication of libertarianism.  All the libertarian 
need claim is that Joe might not have decided at t to move in—and it is unlikely that 
Joe had any reason for making his decision just then. 
 What about the case in which he does have such a reason, for instance where 
his girlfriend has given him a time-limited ultimatum?  Steward responds as follows:  
 
though not deciding at t to move in with his girlfriend would have been irrational in one 
way (because it prevents Joe from doing something he very much wants to do), it is not at 
all irrational in another.  We have a general tendency, if we are prudent, not to rush into 
irrevocable decisions without careful thought and there therefore are reasons speaking for 
refrainment from deciding in the case imagined, because there are always general reasons 
speaking for caution and further thought (though of course, they can be outweighed by 
the need for urgency in a given case).  (2012: 172) 
 
 Yet in cases where such reasons are outweighed, it seems the libertarian is 
still apt to find herself requiring that the agent in question possess the freedom to be 
irrational, and the rational cost problem remains.  To take an even clearer case: 
suppose that Peter Singer has lost his mind and is credibly threatening to kill your 
family on the count of ten unless you press a button that will transfer ten pounds from 
your account to Oxfam; suppose further that you love your family, believe Oxfam to 
be a good cause, can easily spare ten pounds, and that Singer has already reached 
‘nine’.  Of course, you press the button.  But how are we to conceive of the possibility 
of your having refrained from acting just at that moment?  Could this be anything 
other than ‘a kind of random upsurge of total irrationality’ into your psychological 
life? 
 Of course, even in this case there remain features of your action to be settled 
in the absence of decisive reasons: whether you push with your right or left hand, for 
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instance, and the precise level of force with which you push (c.f. Steward 2012: 176-
96).  Yet the problem concerns the libertarian’s handling of the claim that your action 
is also a settling of whether you push.  To deny that agents can truly settle matters 
such as this, simply because their reasons incline clearly in one direction, is to treat 
reasons themselves as constraints on the scope of one’s agency, a move which 
Steward decisively rejects (2012: 141-4).  Yet to permit that they can is, it seems, to 
be vulnerable to the rational cost problem.1 
 Thus while Steward’s focus on refrainment may help to show how libertarian 
freedom need not always amount to the freedom to be irrational, it falls short of 
providing a complete solution to the rational cost problem.  Hence her second 
response.  This is to point out that, since the metaphysical openness that entails the 
possibility of irrational action is, on her view, necessary for agency, any rational cost 
associated with it will be outweighed by the incalculably larger benefit of agency 
itself.  Thus 
 
even if weakness of will is not useful or valuable to an agent, it might nevertheless be 
essential to the very existence of such an agent.  For if, as I am arguing, an agent has to 
be a settler of matters at the time of action, it will need to be possible for her not to act, at 
any given moment, on a previously formed intention to ϕ… if freedom depends on 
agency (as it surely does) and if the metaphysical possibility of weakness of will is a 
necessary concomitant of the power of agency, the metaphysical possibility of weakness 
of will will be a necessary condition of freedom, notwithstanding what is, from another 
point of view, its uselessness to the agent whose existence makes it possible.  (2012: 161) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The same issue can be raised about Joe: he may settle the exact moment of his deciding to move in, 
but does he not also settle whether he decides to move in?  And what could be our grounds for denying 
that he does, if we do not think that the mere decisiveness of one’s reasons compromises one’s agency? 
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That is, it is better to be a fallible agent than an infallible automaton: the rational cost 
pales against the agential benefit.   
 In assessing this second response we must keep in mind the broader dialectical 
situation.  Recall that a proponent of a philosophical position has two tasks: first, that 
of elaborating a position that makes sense in its own terms, and, second, that of 
convincing others that the position is the best available.  Prima facie, the rational cost 
problem causes trouble for the libertarian on both counts: it renders the position less 
satisfying for libertarians themselves, and it weakens it in relation to compatibilism.   
 Whereas Steward’s second response succeeds in meeting the first of these 
challenges, however, it fails in meeting the second.  This is because the response 
assumes the very libertarianism for which Steward is attempting to argue.  No 
compatibilist, for instance, will accept that agency requires metaphysical openness.  
This is of course no problem at all when it comes to showing why libertarians need be 
internally untroubled by the rational cost problem.  But it is problematic when it 
comes to swaying others.  Imagine, if you will, that the libertarian and the 
compatibilist are debating before an audience of freewill agnostics.  The compatibilist 
raises the rational cost problem: is it not implausible, she asks, to suppose that agency 
requires a freedom that is worse than useless?  In reply, it will not do for the 
libertarian to point to the benefit yielded by this metaphysical freedom in making 
agency possible: this will carry no weight with the agnostics, and by the time she has 
persuaded them of this, she will already have persuaded them of libertarianism.  In 
this dialectical context, therefore, Steward’s second response is question-begging. 
 Neither of Steward’s responses, then, succeeds in fully defusing the rational 
cost problem as a source of dialectical disadvantage for the libertarian.  In the rest of 
this paper, I wish to consider an alternative possible line of response.  Despite some 
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initial promise, however, I ultimately argue that it, too, fails fully to solve the 
problem. 
III. A Problem Shared 
 The alternative strategy I have in mind is that of generalising the rational cost 
problem in order to permit a tu quoque response to the compatibilist.  Now, tu quoque 
responses are of course of no use when it comes to overcoming internal obstacles to 
one’s position but, as we have seen, Steward’s response already achieves this.  When 
it comes to convincing others that one’s position is the most compelling, by contrast, 
tu quoque responses are potentially effective, and it is with this second philosophical 
task that we are now concerned.   
 Put simply, the idea is this: the rational cost problem is not a problem for the 
libertarian alone, but for anyone who wishes to make room for any significant degree 
of unpredictability in their account of free agency.  Moreover, compatibilism, if it is 
to be a plausible theory, must allow for unpredictability in some sense.  The rational 
cost problem is therefore a shared one, and not a special source of dialectical 
disadvantage for the libertarian.   
 Allow me to elaborate.  Ordinary people like you and I are not fully 
predictable to one another.  Let me call this property, of being unpredictable to other 
ordinary agents, ordinary unpredictability.  The existence of ordinary unpredictability 
is a truism accepted by all parties to the freewill debate.  Nevertheless, it is one of 
which libertarians and compatibilists give distinct explanations.  For the libertarian, 
our ordinary unpredictability is explained (at least in part) by our metaphysical 
unpredictability—an ‘in principle’ unpredictability entailed by the fundamental 
metaphysical openness of our actions.  For the compatibilist, by contrast, our ordinary 
unpredictability is explained simply by our epistemic limitations: we are exceedingly 
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complex systems and, while it could in principle be possible for some super-powered 
observer to predict fully what a human being will do, it is in practice absolutely 
impossible for you or I to do the same. 
 Now, there is a very deep and widespread intuition that the fact of our 
ordinary unpredictability bears some important connection to the fact of our free 
agency.  It seems to be an important feature of dealing with free agents that, no matter 
how well you know them, you can never be quite sure just what they will do.  Even 
one’s closest friends are liable to surprise, in a way that strikes many people as 
somehow bound up with the idea that we are free agents and not mere automatons.  
Think, for instance, of the countless beginning philosophy students who, upon 
encountering the freewill debate, attempt to demonstrate their freedom by doing (or, 
more often, just affirming the possibility of their doing) something spontaneous and 
unpredictable; inapposite as this invariably is to the immediate matter at hand, it 
nevertheless expresses this same deeply-held feeling that the standing possibility of 
such unexpected behaviour has some important bearing on our freedom.  Conversely, 
to imagine a being that is fully predictable to ordinary observers, the behaviour of 
which unfolds in accordance with simple and entirely transparent mechanistic 
principles, is to imagine a being that is prima facie lacking in (at least some important 
type of) freedom.  This is the case with some (though certainly not all) of the lower 
animals: the point at which we can predict with certainty (or thereabouts) how a 
creature will behave is often also the point at which we lose our grip on the thought 
that it could possibly be a free agent, that there is ‘anybody home’.2   
 Let me call the underlying thought here the unpredictability intuition.  It is a 
vague intuition, to the effect that genuinely free agents must be, at least to some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Dennett 1984: 13; see also his preceding discussion of the wasp Sphex (1984: 10-13). 
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significant extent, at least ordinarily unpredictable.  This characterisation leaves 
entirely open not only what is the best explanation of our ordinary unpredictability 
(be that metaphysical or merely epistemic), but also on just what sense of ‘freedom’ it 
is rightly taken to bear (be that libertarian or compatibilist).  Nevertheless, I take the 
unpredictability intuition—not least because of this very vagueness—to be one that it 
is reasonable to expect any plausible theory of free agency to find some way of 
accommodating; that is, it would be surprising to discover, and we would need a good 
argument to accept, that there is after all no sense in which it is true.  Put in the terms 
of §2, it is an intuition that it is reasonable to assume would be prevalent amongst an 
audience of agnostics; and it would surely constitute a strike against a theory, in their 
eyes, were it unable to make any sense of it. 
 However, any theory that does so find a way of accommodating the 
unpredictability intuition will then find itself saddled with some version of the 
rational cost problem.  This is because our ordinary unpredictability is, to at least 
some extent, dependent upon our liability to irrationality.  To be sure, it is not wholly 
dependent upon our liability to irrationality: there are many cases in which reason 
does not prescribe a unique course of action, as well as cases in which we are simply 
ignorant of one another’s reasons (though the compatibilist cannot afford to put too 
much emphasis on this latter observation, as will be explained below).  Nevertheless, 
were we all both perfectly and unavoidably rational, we would be far more 
predictable to one another than we currently are.  Being perfectly rational we would 
always understand the requirements of reason and, additionally, we would each know 
that there were absolutely no chance at all of the other failing to act rationally.  We 
may of course dispute just how mutually predictable perfectly rational agents would 
be—this will no doubt depend upon our theory of rationality.  But on many theories 
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they would likely be predictable enough as to seem, by the lights of the 
unpredictability intuition, at least somewhat deficient in some valuable type of 
freedom; in Daniel Dennett’s words, each would risk being ‘bereft of personality, a 
mere conduit for Truth or Doing the Right Thing, not a unique and idiosyncratic actor 
on the world stage’ (1984: 70).  Thus ordinary unpredictability requires at least some 
possibility of irrationality: ordinary unpredictability carries a rational cost.  And if 
free agents must be ordinarily unpredictable—that is, if the unpredictability intuition 
is in any sense true—then free agency itself carries a rational cost.  The rational cost 
problem is a general one. 
 We therefore have the following argument: 
 
(1) Our ordinary unpredictability is in some important way bound up with our 
status as free agents (the unpredictability intuition). 
 
(2) At least some significant measure of liability to irrationality is implicated in 
our ordinary unpredictability. 
 
(3) Therefore, at least some significant measure of liability to irrationality is 
implicated in our status as free agents: the rational cost problem should be a 
problem for all accounts of free agency. 
 
 However, this is an argument that the compatibilist will naturally attempt to 
resist.  First, she may target (2).  After all, much of what we have reason to do is 
dependent upon our tastes and desires, and we are often ignorant of one another’s 
tastes and desires.  To take a simple example: I cannot predict what you will order 
from a restaurant menu if I have no idea what kind of food you like, even if I know 
you to be perfectly rational, since what you have reason to order depends on what you 
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like.  Even perfectly rational agents, then, will be mutually unpredictable to a 
significant extent insofar as they lack knowledge of one another’s tastes and desires.  
So (2), the compatibilist may conclude, is relevantly false, and the argument 
unsound.3 
 However, this kind of response to (2), while no doubt correct, is of little help 
to the compatibilist.  For if it is our ignorance that is thus implicated in our ordinary 
unpredictability, and if our ordinary unpredictability is in some way bound up with 
our status as free agents, then a parallel version of this argument will show that our 
ignorance is in some way bound up with our status as free agents—a conclusion at 
least as unpalatable as (3).  That is, this way of rejecting (2) simply threatens to 
saddle the compatibilist with an epistemic cost problem at least as problematic as the 
rational cost problem that she is attempting to avoid.  The libertarian may therefore 
offer the compatibilist a choice: either join the libertarian in accepting the 
counterintuitive conclusion that free agency itself requires a liability to irrationality, 
or else adopt the equally counterintuitive conclusion that free agency requires 
ignorance (or a measure of both). 
 Given this, the compatibilist may instead be tempted to reject (1).  This is 
especially likely given that the compatibilist may anticipate being unable to 
accommodate any version of the unpredictability intuition.  As we have seen, 
compatibilists have no problem accommodating the fact of our ordinary 
unpredictability: we are highly complex and epistemically limited.  But they have a 
prima facie problem explaining why this should have any bearing on our freedom.  
After all, why should your epistemic limitations have anything to do with my 
freedom?  Moreover, this is a question to which the libertarian has a good answer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thanks to Karin Boxer for pressing me on this point. 
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this being that your inability to predict my actions is simply a symptom of their 
metaphysical openness, which is in turn a necessary condition of their freedom.  
Obviously, the compatibilist cannot go down that route.  So she may prefer to head 
the unpredictability intuition off at the pass. 
 Yet matters are not so simple.  Recall that the unpredictability intuition has 
here been carefully characterised so as to avoid begging any questions against the 
compatibilist.  It states a vaguely but deeply held feeling, widespread amongst those 
innocent of the philosophical debates, which theories of free agency may reasonably 
be expected to accommodate.  Denying it outright carries a significant intuitive cost.  
So the libertarian may again present a dilemma: either the compatibilist must find 
some way of accommodating the unpredictability intuition, in which case she is 
herself subject to a form of the rational cost problem and so cannot employ it in her 
dispute with the libertarian, or she must reject the unpredictability intuition, thereby 
accepting a dialectical loss unlikely to be fully counterbalanced by the associated gain 
of freeing herself to raise the rational cost problem against the libertarian.4  Either 
way, the libertarian has successfully defused the rational cost problem as a source of 
dialectical advantage for the compatibilist. 
 However, I shall now show that this line of argument is ultimately 
unsuccessful.  There is indeed a means for the compatibilist to accommodate a 
version of the unpredictability intuition without thereby succumbing to the full force 
of the rational cost problem.  Showing how the compatibilist might thus successfully 
grasp the first horn of this dilemma is the task of the remainder of the paper. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Of course, denying the unpredictability intuition need not constitute an internal worry for 
compatibilism, just as the rational cost problem need not constitute an internal worry for libertarianism.  
For an audience of agnostics not yet convinced of either view, however, both plausibly represent 
strikes against their respective sides. 
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IV. Unpredictability for Compatibilists 
 How might mere epistemic unpredictability enhance an agent’s freedom?  
Since epistemic unpredictability—that is, unpredictability to other agents—is an 
essentially social or relational notion, we might profitably attempt to answer this 
question by considering freedom in its social or relational forms.  Indeed, the way for 
the compatibilist to accommodate the unpredictability intuition is simply to shift her 
focus from the metaphysical to the social. 
 Allow me then to outline the type of social freedom I have in mind.  On the 
well-known ‘negative’ conception, freedom consists in the absence of (certain types 
of) interference by other agents.  On the recently revived though long-standing 
‘republican’ conception, by contrast, freedom consists in immunity or resilience to 
(certain types of) interference by other agents (Pettit 1997; Skinner 1998).  On this 
latter view, a free agent is one that is resistant to subjection by foreign wills, and so 
difficult for others to manipulate or to control.  It is with this latter, republican 
conception that the link with unpredictability may be discerned. 
 Resistance to subjection by foreign wills is a dispositional property of agents.  
Moreover, it is a property that is conferred on agents by their possession of certain 
base properties (just as, say, the property of being a sedative is conferred on a 
substance by its possession of certain base properties, such as that of being a 
barbiturate or being an alcohol).  For example, if you are the subject of a legally 
enforced right not to be physically attacked (and thus relatively immune to threats of 
physical violence), you are to that extent difficult for others to control.  Similarly, if 
you have the capacity to reason critically, such as to render you relatively immune to 
manipulation by sophistical argument, you are to that extent difficult for others to 
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control.  It is one’s possession of these sorts of base properties (being a right-holder, 
having a capacity for critical rationality) that confers on one the higher-order 
dispositional property of being resistant to subjection to foreign wills. 
 Elsewhere I have argued in detail that possession of legally protected status, a 
capacity for critical reflection, and a healthy sense of one’s own self-worth are all 
significant conferrers of resistance to interpersonal subjection, and hence of social 
freedom in its broadly republican sense (Garnett 2013).  Now I wish to suggest that 
epistemic unpredictability is, in the same way, an important conferrer of such 
resistance.  To see how, consider the following case from Derek Parfit: 
 
Schelling’s Answer to Armed Robbery.  A man breaks into my house.  He hears me 
calling the police.  But, since the nearest town is far away, the police cannot arrive in less 
than fifteen minutes.  The man orders me to open the safe in which I hoard my gold.  He 
threatens that, unless he gets the gold in the next five minutes, he will start shooting my 
children, one by one... I am in a desperate position.  Fortunately, I remember reading 
Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict.  I also have a special drug, conveniently at hand.  
This drug causes one to be, for a brief period, very irrational.  Before the man can stop 
me, I reach for the bottle and drink.  Within a few seconds, it becomes apparent that I am 
crazy.  Reeling about the room, I say to the man: ‘Go ahead.  I love my children.  So 
please kill them.’  The man tries to get the gold by torturing me.  I cry out: ‘This is 
agony. So please go on.’  Given the state I am in, the man is now powerless.  He can do 
nothing that will induce me to open the safe.  Threats and torture cannot force 
concessions from someone who is so irrational. (1984: 12-13) 
 
Note that it is Parfit’s unpredictability, and not his irrationality per se, that renders 
him uncontrollable.  The robber’s problem is that he no longer knows how to induce 
Parfit to act as he wishes: it may be, for all he knows, that an offer to sing the score of 
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Cats would result in Parfit opening his safe.  So were the robber to find a manual 
detailing the exact changes the drug has rendered to Parfit’s processes of practical 
reasoning, he could simply look up ‘safe-opening’ in the index of outputs and set 
about producing in Parfit the required input.  Parfit, though still irrational, would then 
be predictable, and hence controllable. 
 Though this is an extreme case, it carries an important lesson.  If I am to 
control your behaviour, I must be able to predict how you will respond to various 
stimuli.  To the extent to which I cannot make such predictions, you are resistant to 
my control and manipulation.  Thus unpredictability helps confer social freedom.5 
 This may feel like a familiar point.  Dennett, for instance, in a section of 
Elbow Room titled ‘The Uses of Disorder’, argues that, since the social environment I 
inhabit may contain other agents that are potentially hostile to me, ‘I have a reason, a 
meta-level reason, for wanting my mind to be unreadable, and this might well require 
that I avoid putting patterns into certain of my activities.  The only way of assuring 
that there is no readable pattern in those activities is to make them random’ (1984: 
66-7).  Moreover, he argues, such randomness and unpredictability is evolutionarily 
advantageous (p. 66); it is also epistemically advantageous, helping us to sample large 
domains, and practically advantageous, helping us to cut short potentially endless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Must unpredictability confer social freedom (in this broadly republican sense) in every possible 
circumstance?  Yes: since resistance to interpersonal control is a dispositional property, what matters is 
only how difficult one would be to control, were someone to attempt it (and not, for instance, whether 
anyone does in fact attempt it).  Thus one may possess (or lack) social freedom even in the absence of 
potential manipulators or controllers.  But must social freedom, and hence a measure of 
unpredictability, be valuable in every possible circumstance?  No: in a world without potential 
controllers, we would surely have little reason to value freedom in this sense.  To explain the 
unpredictability intuition, however, the compatibilist need only demonstrate a conceptual link between 
unpredictability and a type of freedom that we do in fact value.  (Thanks to Anton Ford for pressing me 
on this point.) 
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deliberations (pp. 68-9).  Yet despite this list of reasons for valuing randomness and 
unpredictability, Dennett fails to explain why any of it should have anything to do 
with freedom.  Compatibilists can of course recognise all of these advantages, but 
their problem lies in explaining why an agent that lacks these advantages, that is 
wholly mechanistic and predictable in its behaviour, is in any way deficient in 
freedom specifically.  In short, Dennett fails to show how the compatibilist can 
accommodate the unpredictability intuition. 
 For this we require the republican conception of freedom.  Thus to be fully 
predictable is to be vulnerable to the domination of others, and to be vulnerable to the 
domination of others is to be (in at least one important sense) unfree.  So whereas the 
libertarian is able to accommodate the unpredictability intuition by linking our in-
principle unpredictability with the idea of metaphysical freedom, the compatibilist is 
able to do so by linking our in-practice unpredictability with the idea of social 
freedom.  Compatibilism is thereby strengthened by its ability to match the libertarian 
in vindicating a version of this fundamental intuition. 
 
V. The Rational Cost Problem Solved  
 In doing so, however, the compatibilist seems to open herself up to the 
rational cost problem.  Unpredictability, we have seen, helps to confer 
uncontrollability, which is a form of social freedom.  Moreover, the relationship is 
linear: the more unpredictable an agent, the more uncontrollable.  And, at least for 
high degrees of unpredictability—and therefore for high degrees of 
uncontrollability—actual or likely irrationality is likely necessary.  Thus Parfit 
renders himself maximally uncontrollable, by rendering himself maximally 
unpredictable, by rendering himself maximally irrational.  If social freedom requires 
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anything like the kind of extreme irrationality manifested by Crazy Parfit, we will 
surely feel that we are better off without it.  
 Of course, some degree of unpredictability is attainable without any 
possibility of irrationality: as previously noted, not every practical problem has just 
one rational solution, and we are often ignorant of one another’s reasons.  But for the 
ordinary levels of unpredictability that are intuitively associated with free agency, it 
may still be urged that at least some measure of liability to irrational action is 
necessary.  So, having now accepted that free agents are (to some extent) 
unpredictable agents, the compatibilist opens herself to the complaint that free agents 
are therefore (to some extent) fallible and potentially irrational agents.  This means 
that the compatibilist can seemingly no longer raise the rational cost problem as an 
objection to libertarianism without inviting a tu quoque response. 
 However, the compatibilist, unlike the libertarian, has the resources with 
which to solve her version of the rational cost problem.  Indeed, she has two 
complementary responses available to her. 
 First of all, the overall rational cost faced by the compatibilist is likely lower 
than that faced by the libertarian, owing to a structural difference between the two 
accounts of unpredictability.  This is because, whereas the libertarian links 
unpredictability to a notion of (metaphysically) free action, the compatibilist links 
unpredictability to a notion of (socially) free agency.  The libertarian is therefore 
committed to the claim that an action is free (or that a piece of behaviour is an action) 
only if it is (metaphysically) unpredictable.  This is a strong claim, since it requires 
that each and every action must be unpredictable; and, in any case in which the 
reasons incline clearly in one direction, it entails that the agent was liable to act 
irrationally.  Indeed, the libertarian has no respite from this conclusion; it applies not 
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only in the clear cases, such as Joe’s decision concerning whether to move in with his 
girlfriend, but also in the very clearest cases, like that of Crazy Singer.  By contrast, 
the compatibilist is committed to the different claim that an agent is free only if she is 
to some extent (epistemically) unpredictable.  This is a weaker claim, insofar as it 
treats unpredictability as a global property of agents and not as a local property of 
their actions.  In particular, it need not entail that a free agent be unpredictable with 
respect to every action.  Instead, it may merely require that there be some threshold of 
global unpredictability below which she does not fall.  Thus one need not be as 
unpredictable as Crazy Parfit to meet the relevant requirement; nor must one be even 
slightly unpredictable on every conceivable occasion, even when faced with Crazy 
Singer.  So although the compatibilist may have to concede that freedom requires a 
general liability to irrationality, she need not accept as extreme and austere a version 
of this idea as that to which the libertarian appears committed.   
 Second of all, the liability to irrationality that the compatibilist must still 
concede may be shown to be worth the cost.  That is, the compatibilist may argue 
that, up to a point, the possibility of irrationality is a price worth paying for the 
benefit of increased social freedom: the rationality cost is outweighed by the freedom 
benefit.  Note that this parallels Steward’s libertarian response, discussed in §2, of 
claiming that the possibility of irrationality is a price worth paying for the benefit of 
metaphysical freedom (this being necessary for agency itself).  That response was 
rejected on the grounds that it is question-begging in the current dialectical context, 
since the compatibilist, in denying that metaphysical freedom is necessary for agency, 
sees no benefit in metaphysical freedom.  The equivalent compatibilist response that 
we are now considering, however, is not similarly question-begging.  This is due to 
the underlying asymmetry between libertarianism and compatibilism: whereas the 
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compatibilist rejects libertarian freedom, arguing that we need concern ourselves only 
with compatibilist freedoms, the libertarian does not reject but typically accepts the 
importance of the compatibilist freedoms, arguing instead that we need concern 
ourselves also with libertarian freedom.  Thus the libertarian may be expected to join 
the compatibilist in recognising the value of social freedom.  Appealing to the value 
of this social freedom in attempting to meet (the compatibilist’s version of) the 
rational cost problem is therefore not question-begging against the libertarian. 
 For these reasons, I conclude that the rational cost problem remains a source 
of dialectical advantage for the compatibilist.  As we saw, Steward’s response, 
although effective at explaining why libertarianism need not be troubled by the 
problem within its own terms, fails to neutralise the problem in the context of her 
dispute with the compatibilist.  Moreover, the alternative, generalising strategy 
considered in §3 has ultimately proven of limited effectiveness; for we have seen that 
not only does the compatibilist have a way of making sense of the intuitive 
relationship between unpredictability and freedom, and hence of making an incursion 
into what is traditionally libertarian territory, but that she is able to do so without 
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